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Abstract:  
 
Whistleblower lawsuits under the federal False Claims Act have markedly increased 
over the past decade. While the amount of individual settlements and judgments vary, over 
time the government has paid out an average of about 15% of its recoveries as awards to 
whistleblowers. This investigation used a classification tree algorithm to analyze a sample 
of recent False Claims Act qui tam settlements, identifying several factors that distinguish 
larger settlements from smaller ones.  Notably, the public or private status of corporate 
defendants, the federal judicial circuit in which the case is settled, type of case, case 
duration, relator status, and whether the Department of Justice intervened in the case are 
significant indicators of settlement amount in qui tam cases. Companies can use this 
information to better evaluate their exposure to liability for whistleblower litigation, while 
potential whistleblowers and their counsel can use it to evaluate the likelihood of winning 
an award.  
  
Introduction 
 
According to a 2013 study by the Ethics Resource Center, 63% of employees who 
observe misconduct on the job will report it, up from 58% in 2007.1  In addition, 21% of those 
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employees complain of retaliation after reporting misconduct, up from only 12% in 2007.2 In a 
separate survey of Fortune 1000 public relations executives, 33% of respondents who had 
reported wrongdoing reported suffering some form of retaliation.3 Thus, both whistleblowing 
and complaints of retaliation against whistleblowers are rising. Whistleblowers face enormous 
pressures in deciding whether to pursue a whistleblower case. The prospect of retaliation can be 
daunting, while the potential for a whistleblower award can provide some incentive to ‘do the 
right thing.’ Cho and Song describe this ethical dilemma as the effect of individual perceptions 
and motivation on whistleblower behavior.4  
Cases brought by whistleblowers can also have a significant impact on a company. For 
example, financial penalties and related sanctions—such as compensation for retaliation, 
relator’s attorney fees, and costly corporate integrity agreements—may be imposed under the 
False Claims Act (FCA) or through whistleblower award programs administered by the SEC, 
CFTC, and IRS. These can also affect consumer confidence and investor satisfaction.5  The loss 
of corporate reputation can also be damaging, so companies are well-advised to understand the 
factors that impact large whistleblower-related payouts. The False Claims Act is currently one of 
the most active whistleblower rubrics under U.S. law and is the subject of this study.  
                                                        
1 Ethics Resource Center, National Business Ethics Survey, Washington, D.C. (2014) (last visited January 4, 2018).    
 
2 Id.    
 
3 C. A. Greenwood, Whistleblowing in the Fortune 1000: What practitioners told us about wrongdoing in 
corporations in a pilot study, 41 PUB. REL. REV. 490 (2015).   
 
4 Y. J. Cho & H. J. Song, Determinants of Whistleblowing within Government Agencies, 44 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 
450 (2015). 
 
5 D. Driscoll et al., Business Ethics and Compliance: What Management is Doing and Why, 99 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 
35 (1998). 
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Under the False Claims Act (FCA), a private whistleblower called a “relator” can file a 
lawsuit in federal district court alleging that a non-government actor or municipality fraudulently 
or recklessly misappropriated government funds through so-called “false claims”.6 Such lawsuits 
are called “qui tam” claims because the relator sues for the benefit of both the government and 
the relator. The complete Latin phrase is “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac 
parte sequitur,” meaning in essence, “he who sues for the king and for himself”.7  FCA cases can 
also be initiated by the government acting on its own behalf. It is useful to keep in mind that an 
FCA claim does not require an allegation of fraud; recklessness suffices.8 
In terms of the volume of new cases filed, whistleblower activity under the FCA is at an 
all-time high. In total, qui tam filings over the most recent ten years, an interval in which federal 
budget outlays increased by more than 70% (OMB), are up 37% over the previous ten years.9  
Nationwide, a total of 6,494 new FCA cases were opened in the 2005-2014 interval, of which 
5,298 (81.6%) were relator-initiated qui tams.10 In the preceding decade, 1995-2004, 74.9% of 
5,177 new FCA cases were qui tams (DOJ, 2014).11  
Settlements, however, have not kept pace with new filings.  An unofficial tally of FCA 
settlements and judgments between 2000 and 2015 indicates that 1,369 FCA cases were resolved 
                                                        
6 False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994). 
 
7 JAMES B. HELMER, FALSE CLAIMS ACT: WHISTLEBLOWER LITIGATION 69-70 (Bloomberg BNA, 6th ed., 2012). 
 
8 Id.  
 
9 CIVIL DIVISION. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. Fraud Statistics - Overview, October 1, 1987 - 
September 30, 2014 (2014) http://www.justice.gov/civil/pages/attachments/2014/11/21/fcastats.pdf (last 
visited January 4, 2018). 
 
10 See TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD, FCA STATISTICS 2004-2014,  http://www.taf.org/DOJ-FCA-Statistics-2014.pdf 
(last visited January 4, 2018).  
 
11 Civil Division, supra note 9.  
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in the 2004-2014 interval, with 1,277 resolved over the 10 years ending in 2014.12 Based on the 
sample examined in this study, the median time interval between filing the original qui tam 
complaint and resolution is four years. However, ten years is not uncommon. Over the same 
period, the federal government recovered $21.6 billion (excluding criminal fines and forfeitures) 
through qui tam FCA actions, paying out $3.3 billion in relator awards13 or roughly one-
hundredth of one percent of the $31.9 trillion in budgeted federal government outlays (OMB) 
over the same period. Assuming the accuracy of Elmer’s count of resolved FCA cases, this 
translates to a mean of $2.5 million per award. Thus, the government invested $330 million per 
year in qui tam awards, yielding taxpayers an ROI of 654%. Over the same interval, without 
whistleblower help, the government recovered $9.4 billion from its own FCA actions, at an 
undisclosed cost to taxpayers.14 Along similar lines, in  the 2011-2015 interval, the DOJ 
recovered more than $3.5 billion in settlements and judgments from civil FCA cases. Moreover, 
in fiscal year 2015 the government paid $597 million to qui tam relators.15  
For whistleblowers and experienced qui tam counsel, the economics and institutional 
dynamics of the FCA discourage the filing of even factually and legally solid cases alleging less 
than $10 million in “single damages.”16 While the $2.5 million per award might seem enticing, 
                                                        
12 B. Elmer, False Claims Act Settlements 2000-2015. (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.crowell.com/files/False-Claims-
Act-FCA-Settlements-Crowell-Moring.pdf. 
 
13 Civil Division, supra note 9.  
 
14 Civil Division, supra note 9. 
 
15 OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. Justice Department Recovers over $3.5 Billion from False 
Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2015. (2015)  http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-
over-35-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2015. 
 
16 In qui tam jargon, “single damages” refers to the actual amount of false claims (meaning what the government 
actually lost as a result of the false claims) before statutory doubling or trebling and per-claim fines. 
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the reality is more complicated. First, the $2.5 million is misleading because the distribution of 
resolution amounts on which the awards are based is skewed by a few outlier recoveries in 
excess of $500 million. Second, a surprisingly small fraction of each recovery actually reaches 
the relator. If the government recovers $10 million in a single case (a very big “if”), a solo 
relator’s typical 15% share starts at $1.5 million and is quickly whittled down by contingent legal 
fees (e.g., 35-50%) and income taxes (roughly 45%, state and federal combined). After deducting 
40% for legal fees and 45% in taxes on the remaining balance, only $495,000 remains of the 
original $1.5 million award. After tax, the successful relator’s attorneys would take home 
$330,000 from the contingency, plus reasonable costs and reasonable hourly fees. The math in 
larger cases, which typically involve multiple relators and law firms who must share any award, 
is even more daunting.  
Award dollars that remain in play at the individual level must be further reduced 
probabilistically and then discounted to present value over the expected duration of the case, 
taking into consideration the real possibility that a settlement or judgment may be severely 
reduced because of “ability to pay” issues or evaporate altogether in the defendant’s bankruptcy. 
The vast majority of whistleblower claims are eventually dismissed with zero recovery, most 
recoveries are relatively small, most whistleblowers lose their jobs and remain unemployed for 
years, and many are financially and emotionally devastated before an award, if any, reaches 
them.17 Attorneys for an unsuccessful relator—meaning one of the majority whose cases end in 
dismissal with no settlement—will typically be “on the hook” for upwards of $100,000 in costs 
for discovery, expert witnesses, and travel expenses. 
                                                        
17 C. C. Verschoor, We Need More Whistleblowers, 91 STRATEGIC FIN. 15 (2010). 
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Meanwhile, the federal government’s Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) itself estimates that 10% of its own $603 billion in annual Medicare expenditures are 
“improper”.18 Malcolm Sparrow testified in 2009 that the government’s 10% loss estimate is 
“sadly lacking in rigor” and “quite misleading,” that actual losses might be as high as 30%, and 
that even 10% is exponentially higher than the credit card industry’s fraud loss benchmark of 
one-tenth of one percent.19  Additional losses accrue at the state level and in federal non-
Medicare programs such as defense, education, environmental protection, homeland security, 
and research grants. Given such towering fraud losses and the outsized taxpayer ROI on 
investments in relator awards, companies should not be too surprised if the government 
encourages more relators to come forward.  
A good first step is to understand the factors that influence FCA payout amounts because 
gross FCA payouts are the mathematical basis for awards paid to relators. For the purpose of 
investigating these payout factors, we propose the use of a classification tree model.  Ideally, the 
model would include factors such as the federal circuit in which settlement occurs, the FCA 
success records of various U.S. Attorney’s Offices (USAO) that investigate FCA allegations, the 
type of FCA case involved (Medicare/Medicaid; Anti-kickback, etc.), local and national political 
considerations relating to the sensitivity and timing of the case. In practice, however, much of the 
data relating to these variables is inaccessible because of attorney-client privilege issues and DOJ 
                                                        
18 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE. Report to Congressional Committees, High-Risk Series Update, p. 359. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office (2015), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668415.pdf.  
 
19 Criminal Prosecution as a Deterrent to Health Care Fraud: Hearing before the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs, May 20, 2009. (statement of Malcolm Sparrow), available at 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg55465/html/CHRG-111shrg55465.htm. 
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disclosure policies. Based on publicly available data, our model considers a variety of factors 
that conventional wisdom suggests should impact recovery amounts. 
Information regarding the factors that impact the government’s recovery in FCA cases 
can help companies, government, relators, potential relators, and their respective legal counsel in 
making decisions like, for example, whether to file a claim at all, whether some candidate filing 
venues are better than others, and how best to respond to relator claims. The purpose of this 
paper is to identify and rank the most significant factors affecting the magnitude of government 
recoveries in these qui tam cases.  In Part II, we will review the relevant law in whistleblower 
cases. Part III will discuss classification trees, and Part IV explains our methods.  In Part V, we 
discuss the results of our classification tree analysis.    
 
Literature Review 
 
Whistleblower Legal Background 
 
False Claims Act. Qui tam is hardly a new concept. The legal pedigree of qui tam 
lawsuits in England can be traced as far back as the early 14th century, during the reign of 
Edward III.20 In the United States, the FCA was first passed in 1863 at the urging of President 
Abraham Lincoln who sought to combat rampant defense contract fraud against the Union Army 
during the Civil War.21 Since that time, the FCA has been known as “Lincoln’s Law”.22  
Eighty years later, Congress essentially gutted the FCA when, in the middle of World 
War II, relators themselves began raiding the government’s coffers by piggy-backing their own 
                                                        
20 HELMER, supra note 7.  
 
21 Id.  
 
22 B. Joshpe, Celebrating the 150th birthday of 'Lincoln's Law': Privatized fraud fighting, FORBES, Mar. 6, 2013, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/03/06/celebreating-the-150th-birthday-of-lincolns-law-
privatized-fraud-fighting/.  
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qui tam FCA claims on DOJ criminal investigations of wartime fraud. Congress' undebated 
assumption was that the DOJ certainly must be capable of handling this kind of fraud without 
outside help.23 Among the 1943 FCA amendments, Congress reset relator’s award ceilings at 
10% and 25% for intervened and declined cases, respectively, but left the floors to the court’s 
discretion; in other words, “successful” relators could get nothing at all for their pains.24 Not 
surprisingly, for about forty years thereafter the qui tam bar essentially disappeared and so did 
their relator clients.25  
By 1986, the data clearly showed that the DOJ was incapable of policing rapidly growing 
defense contract fraud on its own.26  In response, Congress and President Ronald Reagan 
reenergized the FCA through amendments that (1) empowered the relator to continue as a party 
to a FCA civil action even if the DOJ intervenes, (2) reset and guaranteed relator’s shares at 25-
30% and 15-25%, respectively, for declined and intervened cases,27 (3) added anti-retaliation 
provisions, making it possible for relators to bring suit against employers who “retaliate, demote, 
or otherwise discriminate against an employee” who brings suit,28 and (4) eliminated the 1943 
“prior government knowledge” jurisdictional bar.29  These changes, together with dramatic 
increases in federal government spending, have since resulted in a major increase in the volume 
                                                        
23 HELMER, supra note 7. 
 
24 HELMER, supra note 7. 
 
25 Id.  
 
26 Id.  
 
27 Id.; C. Broderick, Provisions and the public interest: An empirical analysis, 107 COLUMBIA L. REV. 949 (2007).   
 
28 G. Rapp, Four signal moments in whistleblower law: 1983-2013, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 389 (2013).   
 
29 HELMER, supra note 7. 
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of qui tam suits under the FCA. As referenced earlier, over 80% of all FCA suits are qui tam 
suits meaning that they are initiated by non-government relators. 
Other Whistleblower Laws. Beyond the FCA are other federal statutes that harness 
whistleblowers for various regulatory purposes. The 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act included 
measures to protect SEC whistleblowers from retaliation. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 
incentivizes states to adopt statutes that mirror the federal FCA.30 In the securities and financial 
reporting arena, the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act created FCA-like whistleblower reward and protection 
regimes for SEC and CFTC whistleblowers, partially duplicating Sarbanes-Oxley’s SEC anti-
retaliation rubric.31 In this vein, the SEC recently moved to restrict the use of employer-
employee confidentiality agreements that could be construed as discouraging whistleblowers 
from reporting wrongdoing.32 Additional federal and state regulations endeavor to protect 
whistleblowers in various ways.33 While the plethora of whistleblower laws might seem to 
dramatically increase risks for firms and virtually guarantee a favorable outcome for any 
whistleblower, the reality is that whistleblowing continues to be fraught with financial, 
professional, and reputational risk. 
FCA Procedures. When a relator decides to bring a qui tam suit, he or she must be 
represented by an attorney.  The complaint must be filed under seal and remain sealed for at least 
sixty days. At the conclusion of this period, the Department of Justice (DOJ) must file a motion 
to keep the case under seal if, as typically occurs, it chooses to do so.   
                                                        
30 Rapp, supra note 28.    
 
31 Id.    
 
32 M. Boxer & N. Wang, SEC restricts ability of companies to silence employees with confidentiality agreements. 41 
EMP. REL. L. J. 45 (2015).  
 
33 R. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower provisions: Ten years later. 64 S. CAROLINA L. REV. 2 (2012). 
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While the relator must disclose the facts of the case to the Attorney General (AG), the 
government has no authority to prevent the filing or to force the relator to file in a particular 
federal judicial district. Furthermore, by statute, the DOJ must investigate all FCA qui tam 
claims that comply with minimum procedural requirements. However, relators customarily do 
not actively participate in case investigation after filing the complaint except as requested by the 
DOJ. Thus, the DOJ wields enormous power over case outcomes through allocation of 
investigative resources and discretion to intervene or decline the case. A relator who ignores 
DOJ preferences may find her case either back-burnered or declined. 
While the case is under seal, the Attorney General must investigate the allegations in the 
complaint.34  The seal initially lasts for 60 days but is typically extended—often for two years or 
more—to enable the DOJ to secretly investigate the claims.35 As a practical matter, however, 
defendants often learn of the investigation before the seal is lifted because investigative 
maneuvers can be difficult to hide. 
At the conclusion of the investigation, the DOJ can choose one of the following four 
options: 
1. Intervene in one or more counts in the qui tam action, opting to lead the prosecution 
of the case.36 
                                                        
34 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) (1994). 
 
35 31 U.S.C. 3730(b) (1994). See The Process of False Claims Act Litigation, TAF EDUCATION FUND (last visited 
Jan. 13, 2018), 
https://www.taf.org/Public/Resources_by_Topic/FAC__False_Claims_Act/Processes/Public/Resources_by_Topic/F
CA__False_Claims_Act/Process.aspx  (a seal period of two years or more is “not unusual”). 
 
36 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1) (1994). 
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2. Decline to intervene, leaving the relator and his or her attorney to prosecute the case 
on behalf of the United States.37 
3. Pursue a so-called alternate remedy such as an administrative proceeding in which the 
relator is entitled to the same award as if the matter were pursued under the FCA.38 
4. Move to dismiss the complaint. 
 
Often, the DOJ’s decision on intervention or declination is preceded by a “partial lift” of 
the seal that allows the DOJ to disclose the claim to the defendant and negotiate for a settlement. 
The vast majority of qui tams are declined because of resource constraints, opposition to the case 
by the allegedly victimized federal agency, or evidentiary or procedural weaknesses, as 
evidenced in part by declined cases that end in settlements or jury findings of liability. 
Declination, however, should not be viewed as the DOJ’s judgment on the merits of the case. 
After declination, the government remains a party to the action and wields veto authority over 
any proposed settlement despite taking no active role in the case and bearing none of the costs of 
prosecuting it.39  
Of the declined cases, relators themselves dismiss most because of reluctance to risk 
scarce capital in litigation against well-funded defendants. Declined cases that are initially 
pursued by the relator are dismissed, settled, or—rarely—tried all the way to a jury verdict. 
While some declined cases end with large settlements—one company, threatened with loss of 
attorney client privilege, recently settled for $450 million40—some jury verdicts against 
                                                        
37 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (1994). 
 
38 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5) (1994). 
 
39 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1) (1994). 
 
40 U.S. ex rel. Vainer v. DaVita Inc. et al., 1:07-cv-02509, N.D. Ga (2015). 
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companies are vacated after trial or overturned on appeal.41 The bottom line is that DOJ 
intervention is usually viewed by relators’ counsel as a big victory, virtually clinching some 
award. 
If a qui tam case survives through to settlement, trial, or alternate remedy, the relator is 
statutorily entitled to between 15 and 25% (in an intervened case) or 25 and 30% (in a declined 
case) of the civil damages and statutory fines recovered by the government.42 The FCA 
theoretically mandates treble damages (three times the government’s actual losses from the false 
claims) and civil penalties of between $5,500 and $11,000 per false claim,43 but the trebling may 
be reduced to doubling through the defendant’s timely voluntary disclosure of the false claims.44 
Similarly, the civil penalty amount is subject to the court’s discretion.45 In practice, doubling, 
trebling and civil penalties typically materialize only in the cases decided by juries.46 Thus, these 
damage multipliers serve primarily to induce defendants to settle before trial and do not reliably 
predict actual eventual FCA liability except in outlier cases.    
                                                        
41 See U.S. ex rel. Absher v. Momence Meadows Nursing Center, Inc., 764 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2014); K. Goldberg, 
6th Circ. Nixes $83M Fresenius Medicare Fraud Judgment, LAW360, Oct. 5, 2012, 
http://www.law360.com/articles/384735/6th-circ-nixes-83m-fresenius-medicare-fraud-judgment.  
 
42 Relators who planned and initiated the fraud are entitled to a percentage less than 15, subject to the court’s 
discretion (see, Helmer supra note 7 at 915). 
 
43 31 U.S.C. §3729(a)(1) (1994). 
 
44 31 U.S.C. §3729(a)(2) (1994). 
 
45 Helmer supra note 7 at 849. 
 
46 See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Drakeford v. Tuomey, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 11460 (4 th Cir. 2015) (affirming a treble-
damages-plus-civil-penalties judgment of $237,454,195 against a regional healthcare system for knowing 
submission of 21,730 false claims to Medicare); Lisa Schenker, $237 Million Tuomey Judgment upheld by 
Federal Appeals Court, MOD. HEALTHCARE, July 2, 2015, 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150702/NEWS/150709975 (providing additional background 
on the Tuomey case). 
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According to DOJ statistics, the civil portion of all FCA settlements and judgments in the 
2004-2014 interval was $31.70 billion. Of this total, $22.22 billion (70%) came from relator-
initiated qui tam claims, delivering $3.39 billion (15.26 percent of related civil recoveries47) in 
awards to relators. Of qui tam recoveries, the DOJ data indicate that roughly $813 million (about 
3.7%) came from declined cases, with 96.3% coming from intervened cases. This purported 
allocation of recoveries between declined and intervened cases is misleading, however, because 
the DOJ also counts as “intervened” cases in which the DOJ intervenes after most of the real 
litigation risks have been taken and the work is done by relators and their counsel. The DOJ 
statistics do not (a) distinguish between such “nominal” interventions and “real” ones, (b) 
provide a count of cases yielding recoveries, or (c) reveal any case-level information. 
 
Classification Tree 
 
Classification trees, sometimes also called “decision trees” (for categorical or binary 
response variables) or “regression trees” (for continuous response variables), are simple and 
effective methods used in data mining to explain relationships between predictor variables and a 
target outcome.48 Trees are also used as a preliminary data screening tool to discover meaningful 
patterns in large and complex data sets as a step toward fitting regression or other types of 
statistical models.49 A classification tree maps inputs to predefined classes or binary outcomes, 
                                                        
47 Relators are statutorily entitled to a share of government recoveries obtained through “alternate remedies” such as 
related criminal fines, penalties, or forfeitures (Helmer, supra note 7) but DOJ statistics do not report 
amounts recovered through such alternate remedies. 
 
48 Mira Shapiro, Using JMP® Partition to Grow Decision Trees in Base SAS®, (2013), 
http://analytics.ncsu.edu/sesug/2013/JMP-04.pdf; Russ Lavery, An Animated Guide: Regression Trees in 
JMP® & SAS® Enterprise Miner™, (2012), http://www.lexjansen.com/nesug/nesug12/sa/sa05.pdf; Lior 
Rokach & O. Maimon, Data Mining with Decision Trees (World Scientific, Singapore 2007). 
 
49 Lavery supra note 48 at 6.  
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such as win or lose, or guilty or not guilty. Prior researchers suggest that classification trees are 
useful to predict the outcome of patent cases50 and search and seizure cases.51 Classification trees 
have been used in a variety of settings, including finance, marketing, engineering, medical 
diagnosis, quality control, and credit evaluation.52 
Many variables can be considered in decision making. Classification trees can be used to 
help identify independent variables and interactions that have the strongest statistical association 
with the classification or decision outcome.53 Trees provide a useful, visual model that explains 
how a decision could be made.54 Classification trees consist of nodes where data are partitioned, 
based on the value of an input characteristic, into one or more categories with similar values and, 
therefore, approximately the same probability of attaining some common outcome.  The 
classification tree is created when the data set is loaded into the classification tree software, 
which has identified variables and values. The software evaluates the data, classifies it based on 
the variables, and produces the visual classification tree. The tree provides the visual framework 
                                                        
50 Tammy Cowart, et al., Two Methodologies for Predicting Patent Litigation Outcomes: Logistic Regression 
versus    Classification Trees, 51 Am. Bus. L. J. 843 (2014).  
 
51 Jonathan Kastellac, 7 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 202 (2010). 
 
52 P. Austin, A comparison of regression trees, logistic regression, generalized additive models, and multivariate 
adaptive regression splines for predicting AMI mortality, 2 Stat. in Med. 2937 (2007); R. Guh & Y. 
Shiue, On-line identification of control chart patterns using self-organizing approaches, 43 Int’l J. of 
Production Res. 1225 (2005); B. Rosenfield & C. Lewis, Assessing violence risk in stalking cases:  A 
regression tree approach, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 343 (2005); S. Rayo & A. Cortes, Applying chaid to 
identify the accounting-financial characteristics of the most profitable real estate companies in Spain, 15 J. 
OF ECON., FIN. & ADMIN. SCI. 51; C. Wang, et al., Decision tree based control chart pattern recognition, 46 
INT’L J. OF PRODUCTION RES. 4889 (2007). 
 
53 T. MITCHELL, MACHINE LEARNING, (McGraw-Hill 1997). 
 
54S. ERIKSEN & R. KELLER, DECISION TREES, IN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT 
SCIENCE, 139 (Saul I. Gass & Carl M. Harris eds., 1996). 
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that specifies the sequence of variables and values that are associated with the classification or 
decision process.55    
Classification trees are usually represented graphically as a hierarchical structure.56  The 
classification tree begins with the trunk, which then branches out based on input variables and 
their interactions to create branch patterns. Graphically the tree can be presented from top to 
bottom or from left to right.57 The graphical presentation makes the results self-explanatory and 
easy to interpret.58 This is especially beneficial in a practitioner setting59 such as medical 
diagnosis or legal triage.60 In this study we use classification trees to identify key variables and 
their interactions that impact the government’s civil recovery amounts in FCA cases, predefining 
the outcome variable as small (less than $10 million) or large (greater than $10 million).  
 
Method 
 
Sample Selection and Variable Description 
 
While the DOJ reports annual aggregate settlement data,61 because of the unique 
procedure, politics, and institutional dynamics of the FCA, there is no official repository of data 
on FCA qui tam recoveries at the individual settlement level. As a result, data acquisition for this 
                                                        
55 ROKACH & MAIMON, supra note 48.   
 
56 Id.   
 
57 S. ERIKSEN & R. KELLER, supra note 54.  
 
58 ROKACH & MAIMON, supra note 48.   
 
59 M. Tonkin et al., A comparison of logistics regression and classification tree analysis for behavioral case linkage, 
9 J. OF INVESTIGATIVE PSYCHOL. & OFFENDER PROFILING 235 (2012). 
 
60 B. Rosenfield & C. Lewis, Assessing violence risk in stalking cases: A regression tree approach, 29 LAW & 
HUMAN BEHAV. 343 (2005). 
 
61  Civil Division, supra note 9. 
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study began by selecting a non-random subset of the “major” FCA qui tam case resolutions 
(settlements or verdicts) reported by Taxpayers Against Fraud, Inc. (TAF) as occurring between 
2004 and 2014. For these resolutions, some of the independent variables could not be derived 
from the TAF data. Therefore, necessary data were extracted from a variety of sources including 
press releases, news stories, court filings, law firm websites, and the DOJ’s website.  
During this second stage of data acquisition, the initial table of resolutions was refined by 
adding some observations discovered during the research and eliminating others for which key 
variables were missing. For example, TAF might identify a single resolution of $100 million 
which, upon closer examination, was the sum of two separate resolutions associated with related 
but distinct cases. The final data table comprises 206 resolutions, the descriptive statistics for 
which appear in Table 2 below.  
 
Government FCA Recovery Dependent Variable. 
 
The dependent variable is binary, indicating whether the government’s recovery was less 
than or greater than 10 million dollars. We selected 10 million dollars as a cutoff because at this 
amount, there was a relatively even percentage split in the data.  Please see Table 1 for a 
complete description of the outcome variable. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Six independent variables were used to develop the classification tree. Table 2 provides 
detail on the variables and the breakdown of recoveries by variable codes.  The following 
sections describe the six independent variables.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
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Duration. FCA cases are notoriously long-lived. Duration was measured as the time 
interval in whole years between case filing and case settlement. Duration data were available for 
just over half (109) of the cases in the sample. Among these cases, 27 ran on for more than five 
years and four went beyond 10 years. From a theoretical prior expectation standpoint, longer 
duration might logically be associated with higher expected settlement value because relators and 
their attorneys are unlikely to continue fighting for a case without the expectation of a large 
eventual payout. However, viewed prospectively, the longer it is expected to take to bring in a 
settlement, the lower the present value of the case to government, relator, and relator’s counsel.  
Relator. The Relator variable reflects the functional role or organizational status of the 
relator whistleblower. Relators were coded categorically as Emp (employee of the defendant), 
Mgr (manager of the defendant), Patient (medical patient), Org (organization such as another 
corporation), Industry Insider (usually a competitor of the defendant), Other, and Govt (a non-
relator government agency). In theory, employees, patients, and managers should possess more 
valuable case-related information than others and FCA cases brought by them should be 
expected to settle for larger amounts.  
Public or Private. Public or Private refers to whether the defendant was a publicly traded 
company (Public) and, therefore, subject to SEC registration and reporting requirements or not 
publicly traded (Private) and, therefore, not subject to SEC registration and reporting.  The 
public or private status of corporate defendants (as opposed to individual defendants) is in part 
an indicator of company size; public companies tend to be larger than private ones. Therefore, 
public companies, on average, should be financially capable of paying large FCA settlements 
than are private companies. 
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DOJ Intervention. There were two codes for this variable:  (1) Yes, indicating that DOJ 
did intervene and (2) No, indicating that DOJ did not intervene.  DOJ intervention is possible 
only in qui tam cases; in FCA cases originated by the DOJ itself, intervention is neither 
necessary nor possible.   
Circuit. The Circuit variable reports the federal judicial circuit in which, at the time of 
settlement or judgment, the court with jurisdiction over the case was located. Twelve judicial 
circuits are represented in the sample: First through Eleventh, plus District of Columbia. The 
circuit can impact the outcome of a case in part because the circuits differ in how they apply and 
interpret the FCA and in their related procedural rules. For example, the circuits currently 
disagree over the interpretation of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure62 (FRCP) 9(b) which, despite 
the fact that FCA cases are technically not fraud cases63, has been held by all federal circuits to 
require FCA complaints to plead fraud “with particularity”.64 The Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Eleventh Circuits apply this particularity requirement most stringently, while the First, Fifth, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits less so.65 Thus, cases venued in the former circuits should have 
correspondingly lower expected settlement values than those in the latter circuits because those 
in the former are more likely to be dismissed before the discovery process begins.         
Case Type. The data table included nine case type categories:   (1) defense, (2) 
pharmaceutical, (3) university grant, (4) Medicare/Medicaid, (5) FLSA, (6) AKS, (7) mortgage, 
                                                        
62 FED R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 
63 Helmer supra note 7 at p. 576. 
 
64 G. B. Breen, et al., Supreme Court declines to opine on circuit split over Rule 9(b) pleading requirements for FCA 
claims. EPSTEIN BECKER GREEN HEALTH CARE & LIFE SCIENCES CLIENT ALERT (Jun. 5, 2014), 
http://www.ebglaw.com/news/supreme-court-declines-to-opine-on-circuit-split-over-rule-9b-pleading-requirements-
for-fca-claims/; Helmer supra note 7 at p. 577. 
 
65 Id.  
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(8) hospice/nursing home, and (9) other. Defense cases (1) allege fraud in defense contracting. 
Pharmaceutical cases (2) allege fraud (except violations of the anti-kickback statute) by 
pharmacies or pharmaceutical manufacturers. Often, such fraud involves so-called “off-label 
marketing” of prescription medications written for purposes not approved by the FDA. 
University grant cases (3) allege failures by universities or other grant recipients to comply with 
grant requirements. Medicare/Medicaid cases (4) allege false claims on Medicare or Medicaid 
other than those involving pharmaceuticals, AKS, or hospices and nursing homes. FLSA cases66 
(5) allege wage and hour-type violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. AKS cases (6) allege 
claims made on Medicare or Medicaid for medical goods or services (whether or not otherwise 
necessary and legitimate) provided to patients recruited through kickbacks paid in violation of 
the federal Anti-Kickback Statute.67 Mortgage cases (7) typically allege fraud in relation to 
federally-subsidized home mortgages. Hospice/nursing home cases (8) allege overcharging, 
failure to provide required services or medication to patients, or admission to hospice care of 
patients who are not terminally ill. Category (9) is the catch-all for case types whose frequency 
did not appear sufficient to justify a separate category. 
 
Classification Tree 
 
We used Classification and Regression Tree (CART) software to analyze the association 
between the independent variables and the dependent variable and develop the classification 
                                                        
66 The data set used for this paper includes only one FLSA case, which the CART software automatically grouped 
with Defense cases in building the classification tree. This means that the FLSA case does not stand on its own as a 
single observation representing a separate category. The authors believed it inadvisable to drop this data point from 
the data set. 
67 42 USC §1320a-7b(b), commonly referred to as “AKS.” A summary of the AKS and related Stark Law is 
available at http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/provider-compliance-
training/files/StarkandAKSChartHandout508.pdf. 
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tree.68  The CART software  is based on the original CART code developed by Stanford 
University and University of California at Berkeley statisticians Breiman, Friedman, Olshen and 
Stone.  The CART algorithm automatically searches for important patterns and relationships 
present in the data.69 CART is one of several common algorithms for the creation of 
classification trees.  CART constructs only binary trees, which results in each internal node 
having exactly two outgoing “edges” or directed lines.  A variable or “subtree” composed of 
multiple variables can appear in more than one branch of the tree.70 
Results of Classification Tree 
Figure 1 shows the classification tree  produced by the CART algorithm.  The tree 
includes only the independent variables, presented in Figure 1 from top to bottom, found by  
CART to have a statistically significant association with the  dependent variable (Recoveries)...   
At each node, the tree  shows the number and percentage of cases with small (<$10 million) and 
large (>$10 million) recoveries. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
The classification tree resembles an upside down, physical tree and thus is read from top 
to bottom.  Boxes on the tree are called “nodes.” The top node is the “root” and each node at the 
end of a branch is a “terminal” or “leaf” node. Remaining nodes are called “interior” or 
“intermediate” nodes. Each split  partitions the observations at the node according to the values 
                                                        
68 CART® Classification and Regression Trees. Basic SPM v7.0.  (2013). Computer Software. Salford Systems, 
available at http://www.salford-systems.com/products/cart. 
 
69 D. STEINBER & P. GOLLA, CART 6.0 USER MANUAL (Salford Systems, San Diego, CA 2006).  
 
70 See ROKACH & MAIMON, supra note 48; Pang-Ning Tan, Michael Steinbach, and Vipin Kumar, INTRODUCTION 
TO DATA MINING 170 (2005). 
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or “levels” of the independent variable at that split. For example, the left branch of the tree splits 
on Case Type, Circuit, Relator, and DOJ Int. At the DOJ Int split, CART partitioned the eleven 
observations that reached this split between three “No” and eight “Yes” values of DOJ Int.    
At each split, the node on the right represents a subset of cases with a higher frequency of 
large payouts (> $10 million) than the node on the left.  In the classification tree shown in Figure 
1, the first and, therefore, statistically most important variable was the defendant’s publicly- or 
privately-held status. was. All public companies split to the right while private companies split to 
the left.  The classification tree indicates that cases against non-publicly-held defendants paid out 
lower amounts more frequently (71% of cases) and while cases against publicly-traded 
defendants paid higher payouts more frequently (72% of cases).  Case type was a key predictor 
for both public and private entities. For public companies, case types of Pharmaceutical, 
Medicare/Medicaid, AKS, Mortgage, and Hospice/Nursing had the highest probability of a 
higher payout (84%). While the opposite node shows that cases involving Defense or FLSA had 
only a 39% likelihood of paying a large settlement, where the relator was a manager, industry 
insider, or government agency, 75% of the settlement amounts were in excess of $10 million.  
This suggests that the status of the relator in Defense or FLSA cases has a significant impact on 
the amount of the settlement.   
 Following the tree to the left we see that private entities with case types of university 
grants or Medicare/Medicaid, filed in judicial circuits 1, 2, 4-10, and any relator other than an 
organization had the highest likelihood of a small payout (89%).  However, the classification tree 
does indicate that private company defendants in intervened Medicare or University grant cases 
venued in circuits 3, 11, or 12 paid settlement amounts in excess of  $10 million with a frequency 
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of 87%.  This interaction in the classification tree represents the highest risk of large settlements 
among private companies.     
Table 3 lists the variables by relative importance.  Case type had the greatest impact on 
the payout amount, followed by the Public or Private Entity status of the defendant, the Federal 
Circuit where the case was settled, the Duration of the case, Relator type, and, lastly, DOJ 
Intervention.  The histogram in Table 3 is calculated based on the variable with the greatest 
impact, Case Type. The impact percentages of the remaining variables are based on the impact of 
Case Type on recovery amounts. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
An important part of the classification tree process is validating or assessing the quality 
of the underlying classification model. Prediction accuracy, or how well the classifier predicts 
the actual results, is a key model validation tool.  To this end, Table 4 reports the prediction 
accuracy of this classification tree.  Table 4 indicates that the classification tree model correctly 
predicts 74% of settlements greater than $10 million and 67% of settlements less than $10 
million, for an overall prediction success rate of 70%. The prediction rate is somewhat analogous 
to the R2 statistic in linear regression, which represents how well the model fits the data, while 
the overall prediction rate in classification tree analysis represents how well the tree framework 
predicts the outcome. Just as in linear regression, while it is theoretically possible to achieve a 
100% prediction rate (model fit), a model that is a “pure” fit for the training data would be 
“overfitted” and thus have little predictive usefulness in relation to new data.71 In this study, the 
classification tree performs better at predicting larger payouts than smaller ones. The overall 
                                                        
71 Lavery supra note 48.  
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prediction rate of 70% is fairly robust and can be useful to companies and practitioners in 
evaluating potential outcomes of FCA cases. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Application of classification trees 
When a company discovers that it is the subject of an FCA investigation, the most 
common reaction is to immediately call outside legal counsel to manage the company’s response 
to the government’s investigation. Typical first steps also include preserving potentially relevant 
electronic and hard copy documents, interviewing employees or third parties with information 
about the complaint, and communicating with government investigators, management, and the 
board of directors.72 The precise strategy followed by the defendant should be informed by an 
understanding of factors known to be statistically associated with litigation outcomes. 
Classification trees are a good place to start. The information that can be gathered from this 
classification tree analysis can be useful for companies and practitioners. For example, public 
companies have far greater potential for liability than private companies. As mentioned above, 
case types of Pharmaceutical, Medicare/Medicaid, AKS, Mortgage, and Hospice/Nursing had the 
highest probability of a higher payout. Where the suit is filed is also influential, with 2nd, 6th, and 
9th circuits being the most common places to file. Logically, if the DOJ intervenes in the case, 
there is also a greater likelihood for a settlement, and the data supports this as well. 
                                                        
72 P.B. Murphy, et al., How companies should respond to whistleblower complaints, RISK MGMT. (Dec. 2, 2014), 
http://www.rmmagazine.com/2014/12/02/when-the-whistle-blows-how-companies-should-respond-to-
whistleblower-complaints/. 
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Since use of classification trees in academic studies is a fairly new development, it might 
be helpful to illustrate the application of the classification tree model to specific cases to 
demonstrate the model’s practical usefulness. We will examine two FCA claims that were 
included in the sample.  
 The first, a Medicare/Medicaid fraud qui tam claim against Arthritis and Allergy 
Associates, settled in 2010 for $227,895. From this total recovery or settlement amount, the 
relator received an award of $41,000 or 18%. In the classification tree, the first factor associated 
with the eventual settlement size is the privately held or publicly traded status of the defendant. 
Thus, the Arthritis and Allergy Associates case begins at the top or root node and then moves to 
the left side of the tree, following the Private (meaning not publicly traded) branch.  At Case 
Type, the next factor, this case again moves left into the “Univ, Mcare” node. The case was 
settled while under the jurisdiction of the federal district court in Connecticut, which is located in 
the 2nd Circuit, so the case again moves left into the “All Other” node. Finally, at the Relator 
split, the case moves to the right into the “All Other” leaf node.  Cases ending in this node 
produce small settlements (less than $10 million) with a relative frequency of 89%.   
 The second case involves a large public company, Hewlett Packard.  This qui tam suit for 
violation of the AKS was also resolved in 2010.  Hewlett Packard paid $55 million to resolve the 
case and the whistleblower received $1.89 million. This case progresses through the 
classification tree beginning with the public company branch. Again, the case type is the next 
most important factor, so this case moved right into that node where the branch terminates in a 
leaf node.  Cases ending in this node produced large settlements (more than $10 million) with a 
relative frequency of 84%. Thus, we can say that for public company defendants in all types of 
cases other than Defense or FLSA, the only significant factor in differentiating large and small 
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settlement amounts is the Case Type. By contrast, for public company defendants in Defense or 
FLSA cases, Relator type and (maybe) case duration also play a significant role.  
 
Whistleblower prophylactics 
Without a doubt, companies should prepare to defend themselves against whistleblower 
litigation by using classification trees and other tools, since they may also incur significant legal 
and other business-related costs.73 For example, this classification tree analysis indicates that 
firms in the pharmaceutical industry are exposed to the highest probability of high absolute FCA 
payouts, among both privately held and publicly traded firms. Because of their greater 
vulnerability, pharmaceuticals companies would be well-advised to pay special attention to 
promoting an ethical, whistleblower-friendly environment. This can avert a more complex 
government investigation and negative public attention, which is better for the entire company. 
In general, companies would be wise to implement policies that promote the internal 
reporting and early resolution of such concerns so that the company can limit financial and 
reputational damage by self-reporting to the government if warranted or, even better, by catching 
potential violations before they occur. As Dervan74 suggests, the challenge for companies is to 
create an environment where employees feel secure reporting potential misconduct internally, 
that their concerns will be properly investigated and addressed, and that they will not be 
subjected to retaliation from bringing concerns forward. Similarly, MacGregor et al. propose that 
prerequisites of an effective whistleblower environment include (a) hiring the right people and 
                                                        
73 D. K. Peeples, et al., When the Whistle is Blown, 48 BUS. & SOC’Y 467 at 478-79 (2009).  
 
74 Lucian E. Dervan, Responding to potential employee misconduct in the age of the whistleblower: Foreseeing and 
avoiding the hidden dangers, 3 CORPORATE L. J. 670 at 670 (2008).  
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properly developing them as willing whistleblowers, (b) adequately educating employees to 
recognize wrongdoing and to know how report it internally, (c) promoting reporting in the 
organization through rewards and institutional safeguards, and (d) ensuring appropriate analysis 
and resolution, including clear communication of investigative results to whistleblowers.75 In 
addition, Peeples et al. suggest appointing a corporate ethics officer and providing multiple 
avenues for potential whistleblowers to report their concerns.76 
Conclusion 
Classification tree analysis has the ability to graphically represent a decision making 
process that companies, government, whistleblowers, and their attorneys can use in assessing the 
factors that may influence the outcome of a FCA qui tam case.  When wrongdoing is reported 
internally, companies can evaluate the potential liability involved and respond accordingly to the 
whistleblower’s concerns.  On the other side, prospective FCA whistleblowers can easily see that 
FCA payouts by publicly held defendants tend to be larger than payouts by others and that DOJ 
matters somewhat against private defendants but not as much as does the choice of judicial 
circuit.  
A second advantage of the classification tree analysis is that it does not assume that the 
same predictor variable occurs in every case.  The classification tree automatically evaluates 
interactions through its hierarchical and recursive process. For example, while the greatest 
exposure for publicly held companies lies outside of defense contracting and FLSA cases, 
defense contracting is on the high-risk side for private companies. 
                                                        
75 J. MacGregor, et al., Creating an Effective Whistleblowing Environment. 96 STRAT. FIN. 35 (2014). 
 
76 Peeples, supra note 72 at 479-83.  
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In this paper we examined various factors that impact the amount that the government has 
recovered in recent FCA whistleblower cases. We found that the public or private status of the 
company and case type had the biggest influence, followed by the federal circuit where the case 
was filed. These factor interactions can be useful to whistleblowers, companies, and their 
counsel, as well as to the government, in evaluating their respective prospects in future FCA 
litigation. With the increased inclusion of whistleblower protection and anti-retaliation statutes, 
companies cannot ignore the implications and potential risks of FCA litigation.  Employers must 
be mindful of anti-retaliation statutes, establish effective processes to deal with concerns raised 
by employees and customers, properly train managers to respond appropriately to the concerns of 
potential and actual whistleblowers, and consult legal counsel when necessary.77 Ultimately, as 
long as whistleblowers can voice their ethical concerns about company wrongdoing through the 
courts, it will be important to understand the forces that drive outcomes in whistleblower 
litigation. 
Finally, we have suggested that effective corporate governance and sustainability require 
that the legal analysis facilitated by the classification tree be pared with high ethical standards 
and a whistleblower-friendly environment. We have pointed to evidence that companies will be 
better off in the long run if they foster ethical sustainability and encourage potential 
whistleblowers to bring their concerns forward early and internally to management. We have 
also highlighted specific steps that companies can take to promote these sustainability-enhancing 
objectives.  
  
                                                        
77 Jamie D. Prenkert, Handle with care: Avoiding and managing retaliation claims, 55 BUS. HORIZONS 409 (2012).     
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Table 1 Dependent variable (recoveries) 
 
Recoveries N % 
< 10 million 109 52.9 
> 10 million 97 47.1 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics (independent variables) 
 
Variables Settlements  
<10 million 
Settlements 
 >10 million 
 
Total 
Federal Judicial Circuit    
1st 5 19 24 
2nd 23 6 29 
3rd 4 7 11 
4th 5 7 12 
5th 7 7 14 
6th 11 6 17 
7th 4 4 8 
8th 3 3 6 
9th 15 6 21 
10th 6 4 10 
11th 4 10 14 
DC 5 4 9 
Missing 
 
17 
 
14 
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DOJ Intervention    
Yes 60 81 141 
No 
 
49 16 65 
Case Type    
Medicare/Medicaid 55 31 86 
Pharma-Mkt 4 22 26 
AKS 11 19 30 
Mortgage 0 6 6 
Hospice/Nursing Home 0 2 2 
University Grant 7 1 8 
Defense 13 8 21 
FLSA 1 0 1 
Other 16 9 25 
Missing 
 
2 0 2 
Public or Private    
Public 24 62 86 
Private 
 
85 35 120 
Duration    
0 0 3 3 
1 5 3 8 
2 11 7 18 
3 5 6 11 
4 10 9 19 
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5 8 9 17 
6 2 11 13 
7 1 6 7 
8 1 5 6 
9 1 2 3 
11 0 1 1 
12 1 0 1 
15 0 1 1 
17 0 1 1 
Missing 64 33 97 
    
Relator    
Manager 6 10 16 
Employee 40 46 86 
Organization 1 5 6 
Patient 2 2 4 
Industry Insider 5 11 16 
Government 6 2 11 
None 2 0 2 
Missing 47 21 68 
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Table 3 Variable Relative Importance 
 
 
Variable Score % Histogram 
Case Type 100.0000 |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| 
Public or Private 87.8784 |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| 
Circuit 80.6695 |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| 
Duration 40.3877 ||||||||||||||||||| 
Relator 30.9221 |||||||||||||| 
DOJ Intervention 15.8853 ||||||| 
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Table 4 Prediction Accuracy 
 
Actual 
   
Total  % Correct 
>10 million 109  74 
<10 million 97  67 
Overall 206  70 
 
 
